Milton Friedman; economist as public intellectual by Robert L. Formaini
Insights Economic
introduced the young economist to the
works of Cambridge School of Eco-
nomics founder Alfred Marshall. Jones,
a pivotal figure in the monetarist camp,
introduced Friedman to Frank Knight
and the early Chicago school, espe-
cially Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and
Profit.
After Friedman received his under-
graduate degree from Rutgers, Jones
arranged a scholarship for him to study
economics at the University of Chicago,
where Friedman received an M.A. in
1933. During that year in Chicago, he
also met his future wife, fellow eco-
nomics student Rose Director, who be-
came an active partner in his profes-
sional work. He continued his graduate
study at Columbia University and com-
pleted his Ph.D there in 1946.
While at Columbia, Friedman met
and was influenced by other famous
economists, including John Maurice
Clark, Harold Hotelling and NBER
founder Wesley Clair Mitchell. Friedman
was soon working at the NBER as an
assistant to Simon Kuznets, famous for
developing the national income prod-
Milton Friedman has been an ardent
and effective advocate for free enter-
prise and monetarist policies for five
decades. He was born in Brooklyn, N.Y.,
in 1912, the son of Jewish immigrants
who had come to America in the late
1890s. He attended public schools, then
entered Rutgers University in 1928. Being
away from home for the first time gave
Friedman important early work experi-
ences, as well as insights into entrepre-
neurship and the business processes of
the market economy (Friedman and
Friedman 1998, 25–27).
Originally a math major, Friedman
switched to economics in his third year
at Rutgers, a decision that brought him
into the classrooms of two men who
would guide his later life: Homer Jones
and, especially, Arthur F. Burns. Burns
later became a fixture at the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
one of the nation’s foremost authori-
ties on business cycles and, ultimately,
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors (1970–78). Burns led
Friedman to begin an appreciation of
what good scholarship entailed and
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Milton Friedman
Economist as Public Intellectual
If asked to name a famous economist, most Americans would probably say Milton
Friedman. Economists usually make their contributions behind the scenes at think tanks, gov-
ernment agencies or universities. Friedman has done that, but he also has taken his ideas and
policy proposals directly to his fellow citizens through books, magazine columns and, especially,
television.
It is not an exaggeration to say he has been the most influential American economist of the
past century. He has changed policy not only here at home but also in many other nations, as
much of the world has moved away from economic controls and toward economic freedom.
Milton Friedman marks his 90th birthday on July 31, 2002, and the Dallas Fed commem-
orates the occasion with this issue of Economic Insights. Happy birthday, Milton!
—Bob McTeer
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
uct accounts and many of the tech-
niques applied to them in the 1920s
and ’30s. Because Friedman’s early
study in economics involved constant
contact with theorists such as Burns,
Mitchell and Kuznets, it is not surpris-
ing that he became more focused on
macroeconomic issues like monetary
theory and business cycles than on 
the microeconomics of Burns’ own
favorite, Marshall.
1
Unable to secure a university
appointment because of anti-Semitism
and a dearth of openings, Friedman
began his career in 1935 in Washington,
D.C., during the early days of the New
Deal. At the National Resources Com-
mittee, he used his statistical acumen to
help develop better consumer spend-
ing studies so that improved historical
data and better price indexes could be
developed. Friedman’s knowledge of
sampling theory was especially relevant
in this undertaking, and his first journal
articles resulted from these early efforts.
In the late 1930s, Friedman began
collecting and analyzing data on the





























Milton FriedmanFor the Friedman family it meant a move
to New York City, where Milton joined
the Statistical Research Group at
Columbia University in 1943. This group
worked on a number of war-related
issues, from proximity fuses in bombs
to the vulnerability of bombers during
their runs. Statisticians’ role in the war
has generally been overlooked, but
their contributions were important,
especially as they developed the tech-
niques still used today in modern
econometric analysis.
After the war, Friedman spent a
year teaching at the University of
Minnesota, then took a job at the
University of Chicago in 1947 and
stayed there until his retirement from
teaching in 1977. While at Chicago, he
became the leader of the first recog-
nized counterrevolution against Key-
nesianism. Keynes’ view poses that gov-
ernment could, and should, fine-tune
the nation’s macroeconomic perform-
ance, simultaneously guaranteeing an
end to the business cycle and perpetual
full employment.
Friedman, a classical liberal who
believes in free markets, opposed this
view and the theoretical mechanisms
that justified it. He developed the eco-
nomic paradigm that the University of
Rochester’s Karl Brunner named mone-
tarism. Friedman himself disapproves
of this “unlovely” term (Friedman and
Friedman 1998, 228). Nonetheless, his
resurrection of the classical school’s
foundation for its monetary theory—
asserts that a simpler theory is prefer-
able if it predicts a higher number 
of outcomes—a variation on Occam’s
Razor—and that a good theory will
“surprise” us by predicting counterintui-
tive outcomes. A good theory is one
that “explains a lot by little” and has
been subjected to many attempts at
empirical “falsification,” a philosophical
stance that Friedman apparently ab-
sorbed from Karl Popper.
2 To his credit,
and regardless of the correctness of his
views on scientific method, Friedman’s
own empirical work conforms to his
view of the proper way to “do science.”
Friedman contributed to another
important effort while in Washington
during World War II. At the Treasury
Department, he helped create the cur-
rent federal income tax withholding
system. Friedman says he now regrets
his role, although at the time he be-
lieved the new system was superior 
to the one it replaced (Friedman and
Friedman 1998, 123). Working in Wash-
ington gave him great insight and the
chance for a firsthand look at how
bureaucracies function.
The war brought many changes.
later figured prominently in what he
considers his best work, A Theory of the
Consumption Function. In this 1957
book, he for the first time put forth his
famous permanent income hypothesis.
This explanation for consumption be-
havior offered an alternative to the the-
ory propounded in John Maynard
Keynes’ The General Theory of Employ-
ment, Interest, and Money. Friedman’s
work showed Keynes’ stable, predict-
able consumption function is an em-
pirically inaccurate estimator of short-
run, aggregate consumption. Friedman
offered his alternative permanent in-
come function, along with a theoretical
discussion that plausibly explained
why his theory was better. In produc-
ing this work, Friedman put into prac-
tice a methodology that became the
foundation of one of the most cited
and attacked—and defended—articles
in the history of economics: On the Meth-
odology of Positive Economics (1953,
1–43).
The most controversial contention
in this essay is that a theory’s assump-
tions don’t matter because predictive
power is everything. The essay also
Rose and Milton Friedman in 1987.
While the nineteenth century was a period of rugged individualism, almost every other feature
of the myth [of the robber barons] is false. Far from being a period in which the poor were being
ground under the heels of the rich and exploited unmercifully, there is probably no other period in his-
tory, in this or any other country, in which the ordinary man had as large an increase in his standard
of living as in the period between the Civil War and the First World War, when unrestrained individu-
alism was most rugged. The evidence of this is to be found in the statistics that economists have con-
structed of what was happening to national income, but it is documented in a much more dramatic
way by the numbers of people who came to the United States during that period. That was a time
when we had completely unrestricted immigration, when anybody could come to these shores and
the motto on the Statue of Liberty had some real meaning. This was a country of hope and of promise
for immigrants and their children….Did people come to this country to be ground under the heels of
merciless capitalists? Did they come to make their own conditions worse?
There is no more dramatic way in which people can vote than with their feet. The fact that East
Germany had to build a wall to keep people from going to West Germany is striking evidence of which
country had the better conditions of life. In the same way, the fact that year after year hundreds of
thousands of people left the countries of Europe to come to this country was persuasive evidence that
they were coming to improve their lot, not to worsen it. Far more effective evidence, I believe, than
any statistics on per capita real income, which show that real income went up decade after decade at
a rate of 2, 2.5, 3 percent per year. They came with empty hands....It was the poor and the miserable
who flocked here, and they found a home and the opportunity to improve their lot. And they found it,
not despite rugged individualism but because of rugged individualism. It was rugged individualism
that induced the developments in industry, in trade, that offered opportunities to people. ■
—Bright Promises, Dismal Performance: An Economist’s Protest, 62–63


















nof any other economist. Contributing to
his visibility were his triweekly column
in Newsweek magazine (1966–84) and
his 10-part PBS program Free to Choose
(1980), which complemented a book of
the same name cowritten with Rose.
During this period, he also was an
adviser to three presidential candidates:
Barry Goldwater (unofficially), Richard
Nixon and Ronald Reagan. Many policy
ideas that emerged from this period
bear his stamp: the all-volunteer mili-
tary, the negative income tax, floating
money-exchange rates, the Dutch auc-
tion procedure for selling government
securities, school vouchers and opposi-
tion to wage–price controls. The list is
long and impressive, both in its scope
and in the original thinking applied 
to several of these issues. The 1976
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic
Sciences cemented in the public’s mind
his position as one of the world’s lead-
ing economists. Ironically, Friedman dis-
likes this publicity aspect of the Nobel
Prize (Friedman and Friedman 1998,
443).
After leaving Chicago in 1977,
Friedman became a senior fellow at
the quantity theory—led to the estab-
lishment of a demand-side alternative
to Keynes for conducting macroeco-
nomic policy. Given Friedman’s posi-
tion at Chicago, the prestige of its eco-
nomics department and the ability of
his students, it is hardly surprising that
monetarism caught on across the
nation and became highly influential
during the 1960s and ’70s. Monetarism
stresses the importance of the quantity
of money as an instrument of govern-
ment policy and as a determinant of
business cycles and inflation.
What accounted for this shift in
thinking by economists, bankers and
politicians who had so fervently argued
for Keynesianism for two decades? A
series of articles and books and one
speech did the trick. The books were
Studies in the Quantity Theory of
Money (1956) and A Monetary History
of the United States (1963). The speech
was the presidential address to the
American Economic Association in 1967.
Its thesis was that the so-called trade-
off between inflation and unemploy-
ment, known as the Phillips curve, was
not a sustainable, long-run policy option.
In the speech, Friedman resurrected
the classical notion of real factors de-
termining long-run employment, with
monetary changes unable to lower the
unemployment rate in the long run.
Considered heresy at the time, the nat-
ural rate hypothesis—as it has come to
be known—is now taught, alongside
his permanent income hypothesis, as
standard macroeconomic theory.
In 1962, Friedman published a
book based on a series of lectures he
gave at seminars sponsored by the
Volker Foundation. That book—Capital-
ism and Freedom, cowritten with his
wife, Rose—subsequently sold half a
million copies in 18 languages and
launched Friedman’s career as one of
America’s policy intellectuals. His name
is known to more Americans than that
The view has been gaining widespread acceptance that corporate officials and labor leaders
have a “social responsibility” that goes beyond serving the interest of their stockholders or their
members. This view shows a fundamental misconception of the character and nature of a free econ-
omy. In such an economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules
of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud….It
is the responsibility of the rest of us to establish a framework of law such that an individual in pur-
suing his own interest is, to quote Adam Smith again, “led by an invisible hand to promote an end
which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of
it. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected
to trade for the public good.”
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for
their stockholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive doctrine. If businessmen do have
a social responsibility other than making maximum profits for stockholders, how are they to know
what it is? Can self-selected private individuals decide what the social interest is? Can they decide
how great a burden they are justified in placing on themselves or their stockholders to serve that
social interest? Is it tolerable that these public functions of taxation, expenditure, and control be
exercised by the people who happen at the moment to be in charge of particular enterprises, cho-
sen for those posts by strictly private groups? If businessmen are civil servants rather than the
employees of their stockholders then in a democracy they will, sooner or later, be chosen by the
public techniques of election and appointment. ■
—Capitalism and Freedom, 133–34
Does Business Have a “Social Responsibility?”
The recognition that substantial infla-
tion is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon is only the beginning of an
understanding of the cause and cure of infla-
tion. The more basic questions are: Why do
governments increase the quantity of money
too rapidly? Why do they produce inflation
when they understand its potential for harm?
Before turning to those questions, it is
worth dwelling a while on the proposition
that inflation is a monetary phenomenon.
Despite the importance of that proposition,
despite the extensive historical evidence to
support it, it is still widely denied—in large
part because of the smoke screen with which
governments try to conceal their own
responsibility for inflation.
If the quantity of goods and services
available for purchase—output, for short—
were to increase as rapidly as the quantity of
money, prices would tend to be stable.
Prices might even fall gradually as higher
incomes led people to want to hold a larger
fraction of their wealth in the form of money.
Inflation occurs when the quantity of money
rises appreciably more rapidly than output,
and the more rapid the rise in the quantity of
money per unit of output, the greater the rate
of inflation. There is probably no other
proposition in economics that is as well
established as this one. ■




1 He did not ignore Marshall and microeco-
nomics, however. He has written or coauth-
ored many articles on choice under uncer-
tainty and has examined Marshall’s demand
function in great detail. See Friedman (1949).
Some economists argue that Friedman’s
great success in changing minds on macro
issues flows from his mastery of microeco-
nomics. See Walters (1987, 426).
2 Popper (1968). Two points: Popper was
inconsistent in his belief in the inductive
problem or its possible solution, and falsifi-
cation can only work if a theory is formulated
in such a way that it can be falsified by
empirical evidence.
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Stanford’s Hoover Institution and
moved to San Francisco. Even in retire-
ment, Friedman continues to travel,
lecture and write, still in the fray of
contested ideas, still expressing his
views on current economic and politi-
cal issues. He will be remembered, of
course, for his technical brilliance as an
economist. However, like the 19th-
century French economist–journalist
Frédéric Bastiat, Friedman’s ability to
engagingly and directly communicate
economic theory to average people
may well be his greatest legacy.
On May 9, 2002, Friedman was
honored for lifetime achievements by
President George W. Bush, who said
during the ceremony, “He has used 
a brilliant mind to advance a moral
vision—the vision of a society where
men and women are free, free to choose,
but where government is not as free to
override their decisions. That vision
has changed America, and it is chang-
ing the world.”
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan, who attended the cere-
mony, added, “There are many Nobel
Prize winners in economics, but few
have achieved the mythical status of
Milton Friedman.” ■
—R obert L. Formaini
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Another source of “unfair competition” is said to be subsidies by foreign governments to their
producers that enable them to sell in the United States below cost. Suppose a foreign government
gives such subsidies, as no doubt some do. Who is hurt and who benefits? To pay for the subsi-
dies the foreign government must tax its citizens. They are the ones who pay for the subsidies. U.S.
consumers benefit. They get cheap TV sets or automobiles or whatever it is that is subsidized.
Should we complain about such a program of reverse foreign aid? Was it noble of the United States
to send goods and services as gifts to other countries in the form of Marshall Plan aid or, later, for-
eign aid, but ignoble for foreign countries to send us gifts in the indirect form of goods and ser-
vices sold to us below cost? The citizens of the foreign government might well complain. They must
suffer a lower standard of living for the benefit of American consumers and some of their fellow cit-
izens who own or work in the industries that are subsidized. No doubt, if such subsidies are intro-
duced suddenly or erratically, that will adversely affect owners and workers in U.S. industries pro-
ducing the same products. However, that is one of the ordinary risks of doing business. Enterprises
never complain about unusual or accidental events that confer windfall gains. The free enterprise
system is a profit and loss system. As already noted, any measures to ease the adjustment to sud-
den changes should be applied evenhandedly to domestic and foreign trade. ■
—Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, 45
Who Pays for Foreign Export Subsidies?